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Blum: MONELL CLAIMS

MAKING OUT THE MONELL CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983
Karen M. Blum*

INTRODUCTION

In most Section 1983 lawsuits, the individual actors who
committed the alleged constitutional violations are the named defendants, but in many suits, the municipal entity is brought in as well.1
Local government entities, as long as they are not the state or an arm
of the state, can be sued under Section 1983 for damages and injunc2

tive relief.

Plaintiffs generally use one of four methods to establish municipal liability. First, plaintiffs may point to an officially adopted or
promulgated policy. 3 Second, they may point to a custom or practice
that is not written or formally adopted, but that is a pervasive, longstanding practice that has the force of law.4 The final two methods
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This Article is based on a transcript of
remarks originally delivered by Professor Blum at the Practising Law Institute's TwentyFifth Annual Conference on Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation in New York, New York.
See Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (holding that municipal
corporations may be named in a Section 1983 lawsuit).
2 Political subdivisions of the state have no Eleventh Amendment protection from suit in
federal court. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-25 (1973). See also Northern
Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, Ga., 126 S.Ct. 1689, 1690 (2006).
3 David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42
U.S.C.§ 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2188
(2005) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
4 See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 754 (6th Cir. 2006) (alleged custom of using overly suggestive show-ups); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 936 (5th
Cir. 1999) (finding a custom existed for transfers and demotion when officers reported misconduct); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding a sufficient showing of the police department's custom for treating domestic violence cases
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present the most difficult problems.
The third method can be referred as the City of Canton
method of demonstrating liability. This occurs when plaintiffs point
to a failure to "blank": a failure to train, a failure to supervise, a failure to discipline, a failure to adequately screen, etc. 5 Finally, plaintiffs may point to a particular decision or act made by someone who
is asserted to be a final policymaker for the entity.6 The Supreme
Court has held that in certain situations, the decisions or the acts of a
final policymaker, even if only on a single occasion, may be attributed to the entity for liability purposes under Section 1983.'
I.

OFFICIALLY PROMULGATED POLICY

There are not many newly written policies that are unconstitutional on their face, but there may be some policies that are unconstitutional as applied. The Lanier v. City of Woodburn8 case from the
Ninth Circuit is an example. The city had a drug testing policy for
new employees. 9 The court held that it was unconstitutional as applied to a teenage girl who was applying to be a page at the public library. 10
In Maddux v. Officer One, 11 the city had a written policy aulightly).
5 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
6 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (citing Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1989)).
7 Pembaur,475 U.S. at 484-85 (holding a county prosecutor's decision to send the deputy
sheriffs into a premises to get a witness constituted a county policy even though it occurred
only once).
8 518 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).
9 Id. at 1148.
10 Id.

1 90 F. App'x 754 (5th Cir. 2004).
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thorizing police officers to forcibly enter a third-party's premises
without a warrant12 -clearly unconstitutional. The city asserted that
the policy on the books was an old policy, and that the department
3
trains its officers not to enter private property without a warrant.'
However, in the Maddux case, the police officers went in without a
warrant, and the policy was the source of that action.1 4 As such, the
Fifth Circuit held that the municipality could be held liable, and re5
manded the matter to the district court for a jury trial.'
In Rauen v. City of Miami,1 6 the plaintiffs alleged that there
was a formal plan adopted to stifle protest in violation of the First
Amendment at the Free Trade Area of the Americas gathering in Miami.17 The Tardiff v. Knox County1 8 case concerned an actual written
policy authorizing the strip search of felony arrestees who were arrested for non-violent, non-weapon, non-drug related charges, and
that policy was held unconstitutional.'
A.

9

Entity Liability for Facially Neutral Policy
Adopted With Impermissible Motive

In some "officially adopted policy" cases, the plaintiff may
claim that an officially adopted policy, adopted by a local legislative
board or council, while neutral on its face, was adopted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose.
2 Id. at 757.

13 Id.
14 Id. at 770.
15 Id. at 776.

16 No. 06-21182, 2007 WL 686609, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2007).
"7 Id. at*1.
18 425 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Me. 2006).
"9 Id. at 163.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

832

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

Bogan v. Scott-Harris2° went to the Supreme Court on the issue of a local legislator's immunity from suit when sued in her individual capacity. 2' The Supreme Court held that a local legislator has
absolute immunity when making a legislative decision or performing
a legislative function. 22 Just as a national legislator, regional legislator, or state legislator would have absolute immunity, so too do local
legislators. The Supreme Court did not address the question of the
entity's liability for a decision adopted with an impermissible or unconstitutional motive-race, sex, or impermissible First Amendment
retaliation--or how the plaintiff can demonstrate the impermissible
motive to make out the claim against the entity itself.23 Decisions
from the Courts of Appeal reflect somewhat different approaches to
the problem. In Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River,24 the First Circuit
held that if a plaintiff puts forth evidence that a significant bloc of the
legislators had an impermissible purpose, and can point to the probable complicity of others, that is enough to survive a summary judg2 6 the Second
ment motion.25 In Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta,

Circuit said that if the plaintiff can show that the impermissible motive was a significant reason for the decision, the burden is on the defendant to come back and prove, or at least put in evidence, that the
majority of those who voted did not, in fact, have the impermissible
20 523 U.S. 44 (1998).

21 Id. at 46.
22 Id. at 49.
23

Id. at 54. Municipalities are not protected from suit through the absolute immunity of

the individual. Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1999).
24 134 F.3d 427 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Bogan v. Scott-Harris,
523 U.S. 44 (1998).
25 City of FallRiver, 134 F.3d at 438.
26

507 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2007).
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purpose.27 Some circuits have adopted the "but for" approach that
puts the initial burden on the plaintiff to show that the majority of
those who voted on the decision had the impermissible purpose so
that, "but for" their votes, the decision would not have been made.2 8
In application, the approach adopted by the First and Second Circuits
seems to favor the plaintiff.
Some circuits also adopt a position that individual legislators
who have absolute immunity from suit also have some kind of a testimonial immunity. 29 As such, the plaintiff cannot take a legislator's
deposition, even when the city or town is the named defendant rather
than the legislator. In these circuits, it is obviously very difficult for
plaintiffs to make out the requisite showing on motive.
B.

Whose Policy Is It? Local Officials Enforcing State
Law

Another interesting question regarding the first method of
demonstrating municipal liability arises when there is an official policy, but there are questions about whose policy it is. In Cooper v.
Dillon,30 the sheriff of Key West arrested the editor of a free newspaper for violating a state statute making it a crime to disclose non-

27 Cine SK8, Inc., 507 F.3d at 786.
28 See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261-63 (6th Cir.
2006); Laverdure v. County of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2003); Dixon v.
Burke County, Georgia, 303 F.3d 1271, 1275-76 (11 th Cir. 2002).
29 See, e.g., Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington, 138 F. Supp. 2d 136, 139, 140
(D. Mass. 2001); Miles-UN-Ltd., Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F. Supp. 91, 98-99
(D.N.H. 1996). "As specifically noted by a variety ofjurisdictions, 'legislative immunity not

only protects state [and local] legislators from civil liability, it also functions as an evidentiary and testimonial privilege.' " Id. at 98 (citing Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc.
v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292,297 (D. Md. 1992)).
30 403 F.3d 1208 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
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public information obtained as a participant in an internal investigation of law enforcement. 3' The held the statute to be unconstitutional,
but determined that the sheriff had qualified immunity. 32 The question became whether the enforcement of the statute could be attributed to the city's policy, because the sheriff was a final policymaker
for law enforcement purposes. 33 The city claimed it was not its policy-it was a state statute that was being enforced.34 The court disagreed, and held the statute was not mandatory and required conscious enforcement, and the city chose to enforce

it. 35

Thus, if you

adopt it and make it your own, it becomes your policy.
There are many cases out of the Sixth Circuit involving this
issue. In DePiero v. City of Macedonia,36 an Ohio law authorized
mayor's courts; if a person was stopped for speeding or for some
other transgression, that person was hauled before a mayor's court
and given a ticket or fine.37 The Ohio statute authorized this practice
but did not make it mandatory or say how to set it up--whether the
mayor himself had to be the officiator or some other official in the
town. 38 In Brotherton v. Cleveland,39 an Ohio statute authorized the

harvesting of dead human corneas, but did not mandate it.40 Cleveland adopted the policy and had its coroners institute this practice. In

31 Id. at 1212-13.
32 Id. at 1223.

" Id. at 1221.
14 Id. at 1222.
35 Cooper, 403 F.3d at 1222-23.
36 180 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999).
37 Id. at 775.
38 Id. at 786-87.

'9 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999).
40 Id. at 555.
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both cases, policies authorized-but not mandated-by state law
were consciously implemented by cities and, in each case, the policy
was attributed to the City for purposes of liability under Section
1983.
A more notable example is Garner v. Memphis Police
Dep "t,4 1 which eventually went to the United States Supreme Court as
Tennessee v. Garner.42 In what is known as the "deadly force" case,
there was a state statute in Tennessee that authorized the shooting of
all fleeing felons. 43 However, the state has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and is not considered a person under Section
1983. 44 As such, the state could not be sued under Section 1983. In
addition, the individual officers who shot an unarmed, nonthreatening minor as he was running away from the house he had just
burglarized, received qualified immunity because, at the time, it was
not clearly established that shooting a fleeing felon who was not presenting a threat was a constitutional violation.45 The only defendant
left in the case was the City of Memphis; it claimed this was not the
city's policy-it was a state statute that allowed the shooting of all
fleeing felons.4 6 On remand, the Sixth Circuit held the state statute
authorized the action, but it did not mandate it.47 In addition, the
court found the city modified the policy and did not allow for the

41 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
42 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
43 Id. at 4.
44 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
45 Garner, 471 U.S. at 5, 22.
46

491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989).

Id. at 13.

47 Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (1993).
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shooting of all fleeing felons. 48 The city's policy was better than that
of the state; however, it still allowed for the shooting of fleeing burglars who were unarmed-which is what happened in that case.
Vives v. City of New York4 9 involved a state statute authorizing arrests for what is called aggravated harassment.5 ° In Vives, an
individual sent letters to public officials informing them of conspiracies of organizations involving Jews. 5'

A public official who re-

ceived one such letter was quite upset about it. 52 The statute authorized the arrest for aggravated harassment when such communications
were sent by mail in a manner likely to cause annoyance or harm and
done with the intent to harass, annoy, or threaten or alarm. Pursuant
to the statute, Vives was arrested. 53 The district court ruled the statute was "unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.

54

The city as-

serted the statute was not a city ordinance; it was a penal code provision of the State of New York.55 Thus, the city claimed it should not
be liable for the enforcement of this statute.56 The Court of Appeals
went into a lengthy discussion and said this was an issue of first im-

Id.
4' 524 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2008).
48

50

Id. at 348-49. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2008), which provides, in

pertinent part:
[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she.
. .(1) communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by ...
mail . . ., in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
Id.
51 Vives, 524 F.3d at 348.
52 Id.
" Id. at 348-49.
14 Id. at 348.
51 Id. at 350.
56 Vives, 524 F.3d at 351.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/2

8

Blum: MONELL CLAIMS

MONELL CLAIMS

2009]

837

pression as to whether a city can be held liable for the enforcement of
a state statute.57
The Second Circuit sent this back to the lower court in order
to determine whether New York had any discretion at all to enforce
the statute, and whether New York made a conscious decision to enforce this particular statute.58 In other words, the court implied that a
municipality could not be held liable simply for a policy of choosing
to enforce the entire state penal law.
In sum, if the city's position is to enforce all state laws, that
may not be enough to establish municipal liability for the enforcement of a particular law. Ultimately, cases involving municipal enforcement of state law are going to turn on the degree of the city's
discretion. The question is whether the municipality did enough to
affirmatively make this state policy the municipal policy.
C.

Whose Policy Is It? Inter-governmental or InterAgency Agreements

Another issue, which came up in Young v. City of Little
Rock, 59 and Ford v. City of Boston,60 arises where you have inter-

governmental or inter-agency agreements. These are cases where cities used county jails to house some of their detainees for a certain
length of time. In both cases, the county jails had unconstitutional
strip search policies. 6' Both cities tried to argue it was not their pol57 Id.

58 Id. at 358. (One of the participants at this PLI program indicated that the case has settled, so the issue was never resolved by the court).
5' 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2001).
60 154 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001).
61 Young, 249 F.3d at 736; Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
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icy, but the county's. 62 Both courts held that the city knew what was
going on and chose to put their detainees there.63 In essence, this was
the city's policy too; thus, it is on the hook with the county. Conversely, in Deaton v. Montgomery County,64 the Sixth Circuit held
just the opposite. Here, the county was using the city's jail. However, the court held that the county was not liable because the county
sheriff, the final policymaker, had no knowledge-actual or constructive-of an unconstitutional strip search policy taking place at the
city jail.65
Warren v. District of Columbia66 and Herrera v. County of
Santa Fe67 are cases concerning counties that delegated their prison
responsibilities to private prison corporations. The courts stated that
whatever policies the private prison management corporations adopt,
are going to be considered the counties' policies for which they will
be liable. 68 Counties cannot delegate away their constitutional obligation to care for prisoners. 69
II.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

There are times when there is not an officially adopted policy,
written rule, or regulation, but there is a practice or custom the plaintiff claims has the force of law, and for which the entity should be
62

Young, 249 F.3d at 736; Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 138.

'

989 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1993).

63 Young, 249 F.3d at 736; Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.

65 Id. at 889-90.

66 353 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
67 213 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (D.N.M. 2002).
68 Warren, 353 F.3d at 38; Herrera,213 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
69 Herrera, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d
700, 705, 706, nn. 8, 9 & 11 (1 th Cir. 1985)).
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held responsible under Section 1983.

In Gregory v City of Louis-

ville,70 for example, the plaintiff alleged a custom of overly suggestive line-ups and show-ups."1 Likewise, in Cash v. Hamilton County
Department of Adult Probation,72 the plaintiffs alleged the county
had a policy of cleaning up the property of homeless peoplecollecting it and destroying it. 73 The Sixth Circuit reversed and re-

manded the case in order to determine the scope of the city's practice
and its appropriateness.74
In Lopez v. City of Houston,75 the plaintiffs alleged a practice
of mass detentions. 76 The city put a policy in place-it was not in
77
writing-to attempt to clean up street racing in the City of Houston.
In enforcing the policy, the city engaged in separate, mass arrests
spanning from thirty-seven people to 285.78 Despite the city's arguments, the court determined the plaintiffs had produced sufficient
evidence to withstand summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial.79
It is important to note that having a good paper policy does
not necessarily save an entity from liability. In Price v. Sery,80 even
though the deadly force policy was, on its face, perfectly constitu70 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006).
71 Id. at 753.

72 388 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2004).
73 Id. at 543.

14 Id. at 543, 544, 545.
75 Lopez v. City of Houston, Nos. H-03-2297 et al., 2008 WL 437056, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 14, 2008).
76 Id.

77 Id.
78 Id. at

*2.

Id. at *11.
8' 513 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008).
79
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tional, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the actual practice or
custom regarding the use of deadly force was to shoot first and ask
questions later.8" Likewise, in Daskalea v District of Columbia,82 the
city had a perfectly good paper policy that prohibited guards from
having sex with the prison inmates; in practice, however, what was
going on in the prison was quite different.83
In Marriottv. County of Montgomery,84 there was a paper policy that was perfectly constitutional regarding strip searches of admittees to the institution. 85 However, in reality, the court found a practice of unconstitutional strip searches.86

As the court put it,
87
"[c]onstitutional words cannot erase unconstitutional conduct.,
If you are bringing one of these "custom, usage, or practice"
kinds of cases, it is not enough just to show the practice or the custom. The plaintiff must link the custom to somebody at the policymaking level. 88 The courts have come down on this fairly consistently. To establish this link, constructive knowledge is enough in
most circuits-you do not have to show actual knowledge. 89

8 Id. at 973-74.
82 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
83 See id. at 450.

84 426 F. Supp. 2d I (N.D.N.Y. 2006).

" Id. at 4.
86 Id. at 7.
87 Id. at 9.
88 A municipality is liable when the constitutional injury to the plaintiff resulted from the
implementation or "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those ...said to represent official policy." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
89 Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[tlhe policymaker must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged [unconstitutional]
policy"); Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dep't, 402 F.3d 225, 243(lst Cir. 2005) (stating
that municipal liability can be based on a policymaker's constructive knowledge).
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In most circuits an entity is liable if a policymaker had con-

structive knowledge of the wrongdoing and failed to do anything
about it. 90

One incident is generally not enough to give notice. 9 1

Even a pattern is generally not enough, unless you show a policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge of the pattern. 92 For example, in Pineda v. City of Houston,93 the plaintiff showed there was
a pattern of unconstitutional searches, but did not show that anybody
at the policymaking level had knowledge of the pattern.9 4 Similarly,
in Latuszkin v City of Chicago,95 the plaintiff alleged there was a
practice of police officers holding parties on Friday afternoons in the
yard next to a particular police precinct in Chicago.9 6 The officers
would drink and then go home. One afternoon, a police officer who
had consumed alcohol, drove away and killed somebody on his way
home.9 7 The plaintiff was able to show that there was this practice of
partying and drinking, but did not establish constructive or actual

90 See, e.g., Wright v. Town of Glenarden, 89 F.3d 831, at *3 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that

"[t]he plaintiff must show that responsible policymakers of the municipality had actual or
constructive knowledge of the misconduct, but failed, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, to stop or correct the practices").
91 Meck v. Ctr. for Health Care Servs., No. SA-05-CA-838-PM, 2006 WL 2128906, at *8
(W.D. Tex. July 27, 2006) ("Plaintiffs cite evidence of one incident involving the deputies
which is not sufficient to establish a custom or practice or Bexar County's deliberate indifference to constitutional rights").
92 "A pattern may exist without actual or constructive knowledge because the facts of the
events are concealed from policymakers." Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 330
n.13 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, "actual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom must be
attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has
delegated policy-making authority." Id. (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838,
841 (5th Cir. 1984)).
13 533 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008).
14 Id. at 54.
9' 250 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2001).
96 Id. at 503.
97 Id.
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knowledge of the practice on the part of any city policymaker. 98
II.

CITY OF CANTON FAILURE TO TRAIN, SUPERVISE, OR
DISCIPLINE CASES

A.

Municipal Liability Based on Failure to Train,
Supervise, or Discipline

The third method of establishing local government liability
under section 1983 involves demonstrating a failure on the part of the
city that causes an underlying constitutional violation to occur. City
of Canton v. Harris concerned a woman who was arrested and
brought into the police station. 99 She kept falling down in the booking area and the officers kept propping her up.' 00 Finally, the officers
called her family. 10 1 After the woman's family came to take her, she
was hospitalized for medical care.'0 2 By the time the case was heard
by the Supreme Court, it was assumed that there was an underlying
constitutional violation. The woman was a pretrial detainee and there
was subjective deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs,
which is a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation.

°3

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the city
could be held liable under Section 1983 for this constitutional viola-

98 Id. at 505.

99 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 id.
'03 Id. at 381-82.
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tion? 10 4 The city argued that it could not be liable unless the policy
itself was unconstitutional.10 5 The Court disagreed and found the city
could be held liable under Section 1983 even though the policy itself
was not unconstitutional.0

6

Therefore, a city may be liable for the

underlying constitutional violation committed by a non-policymaking
employee if the city's policy is objectively deliberately indifferent to
10 7
the likelihood a particular constitutional violation would occur.
The Court indicated two ways the plaintiff may show the requisite objective deliberate indifference. First, the plaintiff may argue
that there was an obvious need to train.10 8 For example, if there is an
armed police force with the power to arrest felons, the city better
train them on the constitutional limits of the use of deadly force. If
not, the first time there is an incident that is unconstitutional, the city
will be liable because there was such an obvious need to train, and
therefore it was deliberately indifferent not to do so.
Second, there are other cases where the need to train, supervise, or discipline is not so obvious. However, if a certain number of
events or a pattern of constitutional violations become apparent, the
court will hold the city on constructive notice; and if no training, supervision, or discipline is put in place, the city is going to be held liable.10 9 Both of these methods, the obviousness method and the constructive notice method, are discussed in Sornberger v. City of

104 See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 383.

1o5 Id. at 386.
106 Id. at 387.
107 Id. at 388.
108
09

Id. at 390.
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Knoxville."o

With respect to the obviousness cases, there is a catch: it cannot be too obvious. If a violation was too obvious, it was not a lack
of training that caused the problem. For example, in Walker v. City
of New York,"' an individual who spent nineteen years in jail for a
crime he did not commit sued the District Attorney and the District
Attorney's Office for failing to train police officers not to lie on the
stand.'12 The Second Circuit rejected this argument stating that most
people, never mind police officers, understand that you do not commit perjury, and therefore, it was not the lack of training that led to
the constitutional violation or the wrongful conviction.'

13

However,

the court did say that if there had been a pattern of police officers testifying falsely, then the plaintiff could have made an argument based
on constructive notice of an unconstitutional pattern and a failure to
4
do any training or supervising to rectify the problem." 1
Similarly, in Hernandez v. Borough of PalisadesPark Police
Department,"15 the Third Circuit held that there was no obvious need
to train police officers not to rob the houses they were supposed to be
110 434 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2006).

...974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
112 Id. at 298. The plaintiff in Walker did state a claim against the City based on "a complete failure by the DA in 1971 to train ADAs on fulfilling Brady obligations." Id. at 300.
The Brady standard was not so obvious or easy to apply as to require no training. Id. While
prosecutors generally do not have absolute immunity for tasks performed in their administrative capacities, in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009), the Court unanimously
held that a district attorney and chief deputy district attorney had absolute immunity as to
claims "that the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment material ... due to: (1) a failure
properly to train prosecutors, (2) a failure properly to supervise prosecutors, or (3) a failure
to establish an information system containing potential impeachment material about informants." Id. at 858, 859.
113
114

Walker, 974 F.2d at 295.

Id. at 300.

... 58 F. App'x 909 (3d Cir. 2003).
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watching when patrolling in a particular neighborhood.1 16 In cases
involving sexual assaults on inmates, prisoners, or suspects in police
custody, courts have held that it is not a lack of training that led to the
underlying constitutional violation.117

Therefore, you have to be

careful about these cases-cases of obviousness.
Let me give you some examples of cases where courts have
found deliberate indifference in failing to train based on the obviousness of the need for training. In Gregory v. City of Louisville, 1 8 the
Sixth Circuit held that there was an obvious need to train officers
with respect to the handling of exculpatory materials." 19 Likewise, in
Young v. City of Providence,120 the First Circuit held that a jury might
find an obvious need to train police officers with respect to problems
of misidentification of other officers, especially minority officers,
when they are off duty and the department has an "always
armed/always on duty" policy.'

21

This case involved a minority offi-

cer who responded to an incident when he was off duty and out of

116

117

Id. at 915.
See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998)
Even if the courses concerning gender issues and inmates' rights were
less than adequate, we are not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of
inmates. Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a
jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.

Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11 th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim that officer's sexual molestation of arrestee resulted from deliberate indifference in
training and supervision); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) ("In light
of the regular law enforcement duties of a police officer, we cannot conclude that there was a
patently obvious need for the city to specifically train officers not to rape young women.").
...444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006).
"'

Id. at 754.

120404 F.3d 4 (lst Cir. 2005).
121 Id. at 28.
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uniform. 122 The officers who were in uniform mistook him for the
perpetrator and shot him. 123 The court stated that it was possible to
have an obvious need to train if there is a policy of having officers
always armed, and always on duty. 2 4 A city should give officers
some training with respect to issues of misidentification. In Allen v.
Muskogee,125 the Tenth Circuit held that there was an obvious need to
train with respect to taking emotionally disturbed persons into cus26

tody. 1

A case where the court found no obvious need to train is
Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District.'27 The Sixth Circuit held
that there might be obvious need to implement a policy on conducting searches in schools with respect to school children, but there was
128
not such an obvious need to train teachers as to what the policy is.
In St. John v. Hickey,

29 the

Sixth Circuit held that there was no obvi-

ous need to train with respect to taking wheelchair-bound persons
into custody and transporting them.

30

If you have a number of inci-

dents where people are injured, the entity is most likely on notice, but
the court stated that there was no obvious need for such training. In

122 Id. at 9.
123 Id.

124 Id. at 28-29.
125 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997).
126 Id. at 845.

127244 F. App'x 607 (6th Cir. 2007).
128 Id. at 612 ("Given that it was not clear at the time that the search at issue in this case
was unconstitutional, it is unlikely that the need for training to prevent the unconstitutional
search was 'so obvious' that the District was deliberately indifferent to the need to prevent
the search.").
129411 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2005).
130 Id. at 776.
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Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach,13 ' the court stated that there was
no obvious need to train officers with respect to using hobble restraints and the use of their knees when confronting mentally ill individuals. 132 In Lewis, there was nothing to put the city on notice that
there was a problem until the incident occurred.
In some circuits-the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, for example-a pattern must be shown before the city will be put on notice
that it needs to do something.

33

On the other hand, in Olsen v.

Layton Hills Mall, 34 the Tenth Circuit held that the county had con-

structive notice that it needed to train the admitting jail officials about
the problems of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder ("OCD").135 The

court reasoned that prison officials knew what was going on with respect to OCD prisoners, and there was a lot of information on OCD
and people with OCD. 136 The dissent said there was a lot of information on OCD, but it is all on doctors' desks, not on prison officials'
desks. 13' Also, OCD is not like other things about which law enforcement agencies are being bombarded with information.

38

As

such, it was not something one would expect to know about and have
131 No. 06-81139-CIV, 2008 WL 763250, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2008).
132 Id. at *9.
133 See, e.g., Lewis v. Pugh, 289 F. App'x 767, 775 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that plaintiff

failed to establish a pattern of bad acts similar to what had transpired); McDowell v. Brown,
392 F.3d 1283, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of
injuries attributable to the county's budgeting practices); Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160,
1174 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the district court that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
pattern of unconstitutional searches by school officials); Thompson v. Upshur County, 245
F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he plaintiff must generally demonstrate at least
a pattern of similar violations").
114 312 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2002).
135 Id. at 1320.
136 Id.

1' Id. at 1328 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
138 Id.
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prison officials trained on.
B.

Boardof County Commissioners ofBryan County v.
Brown: Failure to Screen Cases

Bryan County v. Brown 139 is an important case. Bryan County
brings together the final policymaker issue, which I will discuss
shortly, and the City of Canton issue. In this case, a final policymaker, the county sheriff, hired his nephew's son to be a reserve deputy sheriff, and gave him no training. 140 The part of the case that
went up to the Supreme Court was the issue of failing to adequately
screen when hiring. 141 The county sheriff knew his nephew's son had
a criminal record, but the offenses were all misdemeanors (DUI, assault, and battery). 142

During his second week on the job, the

nephew's son yanked some woman out of a truck with such force that
43

he broke both her kneecaps. 1

As in City of Canton, there was no question that there was an
underlying constitutional violation committed by a non-policymaking
employee, here a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation. The
question presented was whether the county could be held liable for
the underlying constitutional violation based on this county sheriffs
single bad hiring decision? 144 This presents a tougher causation issue
than the City of Canton failure to train or failure to supervise claim.
The Court held that the failure to adequately screen requires the
139 520 U.S. 397 (1997).

140 Id. at 401.
141 Id. at 402.
142 Id. at 401.
143 Id.

1" Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 402.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/2

20

Blum: MONELL CLAIMS

MONELL CLAIMS

2009]

plaintiff to demonstrate the requisite deliberate indifference on the
part of the final policymaker, which is a tough burden.1 45 The plaintiff had to show that if the county sheriff had read the deputy's file
from cover to cover, he would have understood that the "plainly obvious consequence"' 146 of hiring this individual would be the particular constitutional violation that resulted. Bryan County has been extended, not only to bad screening and bad hiring cases, but to failure
147
to train, failure to supervise, and failure to discipline cases.
The standard from Bryan County is a tough one for plaintiffs
to satisfy. For example, in Hardeman v. Kerr County, 148 a man who
was hired by a school district and worked in a school made improper
sexual advances to many of the female students. 149 After he was fired
from that job, he was hired as a guard in a women's prison where he
raped one of the inmates.

50

The Fifth Circuit said it was not plainly

obvious that his history with the school district would result in this
5
kind of constitutional violation.' '

Crete v. City of Lowell 152 concerned the hiring of a police officer who had a criminal history that included an assault and battery
charge. 53 The First Circuit found that it was not plainly obvious that
he, the police officer, was going to engage in excessive force in this

141Id. at 405.
146

Id. at411.

147 See supra text accompanying note 133.
148

244 F. App'x 593 (5th Cir. 2007).

141 Id.

at 596.

150Id. at 594.

...Id. at 596.
152 418 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2005).
'

Id.at 56-57.
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case. 154 Why not? One reason the court stated was because the police officer's probation officer said that, despite his record of assault
' 55
and batteries, he would "make an excellent police officer."'
Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills 156 involved an
officer who committed every possible infraction throughout his training, such as shooting when he was not supposed to shoot.

57

The

Fifth Circuit held that incidents that occurred during training are not
constitutional violations. 158 Because plaintiff could not point to prior
constitutional violations, there was nothing that happened during
training that would make it plainly obvious that this officer was going
to engage in the use of excessive force with a deadly weapon, the par59
ticular constitutional violation asserted in the case. 1
C.

Derivative Nature of Liability Under City of Canton
and Bryan County

It is important to keep in mind that the nature of municipal liability under both City of Canton and Bryan County is derivative, in
the sense that if there is no underlying constitutional violation committed by an individual, there will be no municipal liability for failing
to train, supervise, discipline or screen.

This is the principle an-

nounced by the Court in City of Los Angeles v. Heller.1 60 If any particular official or individual did not commit a constitutional violation,

114Id. at 66.
155Id.
156 406 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2005).
157 Id. at 378.
158 Id.at 384.
59 id. at 385.
160 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
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then there should not be any entity liability.16 ' For example, Best v.
Cobb County162 and Trigalet v. City of Tulsa 163 are two cases that best
exemplify this rule. Both cases involved high-speed pursuit cases
where the plaintiffs could not win against the individual officers involved because of the tough standard of culpability governing substantive due process claims announced by the Court in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis.1 64 In these cases, innocent people were killed
during the course of a pursuit when they were hit by the pursued suspect's car.

65

However, the officers clearly did not have the purpose

or intent to harm needed to make out a substantive due process claim
under County of Sacramento.166 In both cases, the plaintiffs tried to
demonstrate that a policy, on the part of the city or county, was so
bad that it was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that this type
of tragedy was going to happen.' 67 Imagine walking into court and
demonstrating the worst possible pursuit policy. Assume the policies
stated that officers could pursue under any conditions. The officers
are never called off the pursuit-regardless of the surrounding circumstances-until the assailant is apprehended. Even if that is the
policy, without an underlying substantive due process violation by
the officers involved, there would be no municipal liability.

The

Third and Second Circuits have a couple of cases discussing munici-

.61Id. at 799.
162 239 F. App'x 501 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
63 239 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2001).
'64 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
165 Cobb County, 239 F. App'x at 502; Trigalet, 239 F.3d at 1151.
166 523 U.S. at 854.
167 Cobb County, 239 F. App'x at 502; Trigalet, 239 F.3d at 1155 -56.
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pal liability without individual liability. 168 However, the courts never
discussed municipal liability without a constitutional violation.
When defending this type of case, it is imperative to make sure there
is a constitutional violation. Otherwise, no one should be in court.
D.

Bifurcation

Heller prompts many defendants to move for bifurcation
when plaintiff sues both the individual officers and the city. 169 Bifurcating the case and forcing plaintiff to establish the underlying constitutional violation by the individual officer before allowing plaintiff to
pursue the Monell claim is a strategy that protects defendants from
burdensome discovery requests until a violation is shown. It is also a
strategy that may eliminate the need to proceed against the municipality, either because plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional wrong
or because the city agrees initially to indemnify and pay any judgment should the plaintiff prevail against the individual officer. 170
A plaintiff might attempt to avoid bifurcation by not naming
168See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The precedent in our
circuit requires the district court to review the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 claims against the individual police officers, as the City's liability
for a substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer."). See also Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights Commission, 194 F.3d 341, 349,
350 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a municipality can still be found liable even though there is
no liability on a named defendant); Sforza v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6122(DLC),
2009 WL 857496, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) ("[W]here claims against the individual
officers have been dismissed without reaching their merits, it is still possible for a jury to
find a constitutional violation for which a municipality may, though its policies, practices, or
customs, be liable.").
169See generally Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
PoliceBrutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993).
170See, e.g., Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 339-40 (6th Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Town of
Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 (1 st Cir. 2002). But see Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d
311, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A] finding against officers in their individual capacities does not
serve all the purposes of, and is not the equivalent of, a judgment against the municipality.").
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the individual officers as defendants, bringing only the Monell claim
against the city. This strategy did not work for the plaintiff in Young
who tried to avoid bifurcation by dropping the individual shooting officers from the claim. 71 The district court held that it was going to
bifurcate anyway, and the plaintiff would be required to make out an
underlying constitutional violation by an individual officer before
plaintiff could proceed against the city. 172 Ultimately, this strategy

created problems when plaintiff was left with a finding of liability
against one of the officers (who was not a named defendant) and
summary judgment in favor of the city on the Monell claim.
In McCoy v. City of New York, 173 the court denied bifurcation
and stated that the defendants' arguments in favor of bifurcation
overlooked the possibility of municipal liability without individual
liability. 174 This may occur if the officer is not liable because of
qualified immunity. For example, if during phase one of bifurcation
the court concludes there is a constitutional violation, but the officer
gets qualified immunity on the ground that the law was not clearly established, you still have the underlying constitutional violation, and
the case may proceed on the Monell claim. The McCoy Court also
175
stated that bifurcation might not be so efficient.

171 See Young, 404 F.3d at 9.
172

See id.

173 No. CV 07-4143 (RJD)(JO), 2008 WL 3884388 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2008).
174 Id. at *2.

175 Id. at *2-3. See also Jeanty v. County of Orange, 379 F. Supp. 2d 533, 550 (S.D.N.Y.

2005) ("[S]everance of the claims or separate trials would not further convenience or be
conducive to 'expedition and economy;' rather, it would require the Court to try two cases
that are essentially the same except for additional evidence which might be presented in support of plaintiffs Monell claim. Such a result, would clearly not further Rule 42(b)'s goals
of efficiency and convenience.").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

25

854
IV.

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

FINAL POLICYMAKERS

In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,the Court held that a single
decision by an official with policymaking authority in a given area
could constitute official policy and be attributed to the government
itself under certain circumstances.

76

Thus, in Pembaur, the county

could be held liable for a single decision by a county prosecutor,
which authorized an unconstitutional entry into the plaintiffs
clinic.'77 With respect to municipal liability based on acts or decisions of final policymakers, the Court has made clear that who constitutes a final policymaker is a question of state law.' 78 A final policymaker will generally be someone whose decisions are not subject
to review by another official or governmental body. 179 Therefore, if
there is any kind of review of an individual's decision, that individual
is not the final policymaker.18 0

Furthermore, one might be a final

policymaker in one context and not in another. For example, in Ar-

176 475 U.S. 469, 470 (1986).
177

Id. at 485. See also Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 942 (1st Cir. 2008) ("We are

bound by Pembaur and conclude that a single decision by a final policymaker can result in
municipal liability.").
178 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).
179 See generally McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997). See also
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (arguing the mayor's constructive discharge of plaintiff was final in the sense that it was not reviewable by any other
person or any other body or agency in the Borough).
180See, e.g., Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320-26 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Because the
Career Service Council has the power to reverse any termination decision made by Roberts,
he is not a final policymaker with respect to termination decisions at the library."); Tharling
v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a local law requiring
approval of City Council for employment decisions made by City Manager rendered City
Council the final policymaker); Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 274
F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The question is whether the promulgator, or the actor, as the
case may be-in other words, the decisionmaker-was at the apex of authority for the action
in question.").
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endale v. City of Memphis,'8 ' the chief of police is the final policymaker with respect to suspensions that are ten days or less because
there is no subsequent review. 182 On the other hand, the chief of police is not a final policymaker if the suspension is more than ten days
because the Civil Service Commission reviews that decision.' 83 Both
plaintiffs and defendants should be very careful about attention to
state law and local ordinances in final policymaker cases.
Is every act or decision by someone who is a final policymaker considered "policy?" No. There are some cases where the individual who normally would be the final policymaker has done
something or made a decision contrary to what is "official" final policy. For example, if a mayor sexually assaults young women in his
office, that conduct will most likely not be considered official "policy" attributable to the city. 184 Likewise, in Auriemma v. City of Chicago,185 the superintendent of police hired, fired, promoted, and demoted based on race, Which was contrary to the written policy of the
city.186 In Thomas v. Roberts,187 the school assistant principal's decision to strip search school children without individualized reasonable
suspicion, a decision not subject to review, did not represent official
"policy" of the school district where it was the District's explicit pol-

81 519 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2008).
182 Id. at 602.
183 Id.

See Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2008).
185 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992).
186 Id. at 400.
187 261 F.3d 1160 (11 th Cir. 2001), opinion reinstatedand supplemented by Thomas v.

184

Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11 th Cir. 2003).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [2012], Art. 2

856

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

icy that searches not be conducted absent reasonable suspicion.188
However, it is important to note Simmons v. Uintah Health
Care Special Service District.'89 In this case, the Tenth Circuit recently held that "[a]ctions taken by a municipality's final policymakers, even in contravention of their own written policies, are fairly attributable to the municipality."'1 90 Simmons can be distinguished from
Roe, Auriemma, and Thomas. Those three cases all involved an individual final policymaker-mayor, chief of police, and assistant principal of schools-who performed an act or made a decision contrary
to a written policy.' 9' In the Simmons case, it was the local legislative body that made the decision to fire someone without due process,
which was contrary to the written policy of the entity itself.1 92 As
such, the Tenth Circuit did not allow the legislative body to make a
decision contrary to its own written policy, and then say that there
93
was no entity liability. 1

188

261 F.3dat 1172-73.

"9 506 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2007).
190 Id. at 1287.
"'j Roe, 542 F.3d at 33; Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400; Thomas, 261 F.3d at 1172-73.
192 Simmons, 506 F.3d at 1283.
193 Id. at 1285.
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